

marriage, but also how the conjugal couple became the idealized meaning of family.

Cuno uses diverse sources to support his analytical propositions, including novels and memoirs, mid- to late-nineteenth-century census data and village reports, and legal treatises, some of which have been used by previous historians. But Cuno's readings and interpretations offer fresh insights that further support his emphasis on contingent patterns of marriage practices and legal change within the emerging hegemony of the new ideal family. For instance, late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century novels generally were written in a style to produce the supremacy of love in a marriage. To the contrary, the writings of the memoirists continued to project the cultural expectation that affection among spouses would develop after marriage. Such disparities between the plot lines of novels and the sub-plots of remembered life are critical in understanding how despite ideational hegemony of romantic monogamous marriage, practices of family life have developed in multiple patterns, and continue to be lived in varied combinations. Cuno uses memoirs effectively as a prime source for studying "Marriage in Practice" in chapter 2. As a source for "recollection of [the memoirists'] sentiments," memoirs demonstrate how polygyny lost its place in the new family ideology, how families negotiated for a monogamous contract, and, in particular, how women in the family asserted their expectations of a lasting companionate marriage. Indeed this change in expectation seems to have happened over a relatively short period: women whose mothers lived in polygynous households considered their husbands' polygynous practices intolerable. Cuno recalls this sentiment in Huda Sha'rawi's memoirs; a sentiment echoed in Halidé Edib Adivar's *House with Wisteria: Memoirs of Turkey Old and New* (2003).

Cuno's use of family photographs is another welcome and persuasive move in tracing this history. The coincidence of changes in familial concepts and practices with the arrival of photography in the Middle East gives the historian a significant archival resource. Both the physical camera and the "family photographs" were among those objects of everyday life that generated changes in practices and "a couple-centered notion of family" (69). As Cuno argues, "regardless of whether they lived in a joint or conjugal family household, couples who posed for intimate photos . . . presented themselves as bourgeois conjugal families" (55). These photographs not only reflected the process of "ideationalization" of the conjugal couple, they in turn contributed to its power incessantly: these photographs were framed and displayed in the home in prominent places. Their ubiquitous visual presence contributed to the normative idealness of the conjugal couple.

Subsequent chapters ("Marriage Reformed," "Marriage in Law," "Marriage Codified," and "Marriage Modernized?") fully trace the developments in the ideas of family, and in the idealization of the conjugal couple and their children, linked with the critique of polygyny and easy divorce for men as a source of social instability and erosion of civil sentiments. The critique led to "the

invention of family law as a distinct category of law known as 'personal status law'" (78), a term that "was unknown in Muslim jurisprudence before the late nineteenth century" (165), a critical argument discussed in chapter 5. In particular, the decision to develop civil, commercial, and criminal laws on the basis of French law in Egypt, to be enacted through the establishment of National Courts, and separating family law to a separate domain and under separate courts, had the enormous consequence that "nowadays the association of religion with the domestic realm and the derivation of family law from religious law is taken for granted" (159). Cuno's detailed discussion of Qadri's Code demonstrates wonderfully how the Code generated a family law that took its content from the Hanafi school while presenting it in the form of modern law articles "without any acknowledgment of the historical scholarship that led to its formulation. There was no hint that these rules resulted from generations of discussion and debate or that they might be subject to disagreement and revision in certain circumstances" (169).

Despite such meticulous attention to detailed textual, organizational, and visual analysis, in Cuno's own narrative one occasionally finds slippages among family ideology, family life, and family law, and at times the use of companionate marriage and monogamy as necessarily coincidental terms, demonstrating the weight of the hegemony of these ideas on all of us. Nonetheless, this book opens up fresh possibilities for further research on practices of family life beyond the power of hegemonic ideas. It is a must-read not only for historians of the modern Middle East, but for historians of family law and life more generally.

AFSANEH NAJMABADI
Harvard University

MATEO MOHAMMAD FARZANEH. *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution and the Clerical Leadership of Khurasani*. (Modern Intellectual and Political History of the Middle East.) Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2015. Pp. xxii, 329. \$49.95.

Recently, the life and political views of Akhund Mullah Mohammad Kazim Khurasani (1839–1911) have been the subject of much scholarly interest, particularly in Iran. This has been prompted both by the publication of a number of Khurasani's previously unknown political writings and by the political need for reassessing the role of Shi'a state theory in Iran. With *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution and the Clerical Leadership of Khurasani*, Mateo Mohammad Farzaneh has written the first book-length work in English analyzing Khurasani's contribution to the Constitutional Revolution. The book includes an interesting account of the intellectual and political debates of Iranian religious scholars at the beginning of the twentieth century and the political conditions that made it possible for some of the 'ulama' and secularists to work together in promoting constitutional ideas and opposing a despotic monarchy.

Farzaneh's book is composed of three parts: "The Iranian State and Religion" a review of the historical

background; “Khurasani and Constitutionalism,” which covers Khurasani’s life and views; and “A House Divided,” a discussion of Khurasani’s relationship with Shaykh Fazlullah Nuri, the ultraconservative leader of the anti-constitutionalist *‘ulama’* in Tehran. The bulk of Farzaneh’s original research is in the last two parts.

Farzaneh’s overall narrative of Iran’s encounter with the West and constitutionalism is heavily influenced by the modernization theory. Implied in his argument is that three types of positions toward the Western powers and Western ideas evolved. Some Iranians rejected the Western influence and its political model and instead defended the existing order and its inherent values. Farzaneh calls them “dogmatic” or “antireform.” A few intellectuals accepted what he calls “the European model of life and culture” (52), becoming what other scholars have called “Westernized intellectuals.” Other Iranians engaged with Western ideas and tried to formulate their own synthesis of progress. Farzaneh uses a variety of terms for this group, including “reformist,” “modernist,” and “progressive thinkers.”

Building on the work of other scholars who have written about the failure of modernity in Iran, Farzaneh concludes: “Iranians consistently failed to adjust their intellectual discourse and likewise failed to consider the possibility of a different kind of intellectual awakening, or one that was different from Europe’s. Iranians also misunderstood the notion of ‘faith’ and how to separate it from reform in the political realm that lessened the power of the *ulama’*” (53). Farzaneh’s last assertion is his point of departure in discussing the importance of Khurasani’s contribution as a progressive religious thinker in defending the Constitutional Revolution despite its being an essentially secular political development.

Farzaneh argues that it was Khurasani’s unique understanding of *ijtihād* as defined in his 1903 *Kifayat al-Usul* (Sufficiency of Principles), his major treatise on *fiqh* and now a classic work in Shi’a jurisprudence, that permitted him to conclude that shari’a and secular laws can together be the basis of a constitutional state. Farzaneh explains that Khurasani’s defense of constitutionalism is “based on his ‘reformed’ knowledge of Shi’ite [*sic*] jurisprudence” (144). Accordingly, in Khurasani’s view, a jurist could arrive at “certainty” by following a “rationalist argument” (145, 146). While the other *usuli* (principle-based) jurisprudence scholars had also discussed the certainty of a ruling based on rationality and sufficient evidence, Khurasani went much further than promoting “the use of rationalist argument on the same level as the Qur’an, the Hadith, and ‘consensus’” (145). In fact, Khurasani used this “rationalist argument” to defend constitutionalism as an Islamic duty. It is doubtful, however, that such an approach could lead to a separation of state and religion or lessen the political power of the *‘ulama’*.

Farzaneh tells us that Khurasani argued for the need of a “*mutlaq mujtahid*,” an absolute jurist, to deal with “contemporary pressing issues in society” (148). Yet, in the Shi’a jurisprudence there can never be a consensus in any rulings including the need for an absolute jurist. Shi’a

jurisprudence is based on multipolarity (hence existence of numbers of *maraje taqlid*—sources of emulations—at any given time after the formation of this office in the late nineteenth century) and consensus is actually antithetical to the Shi’a jurisprudence. Indeed, many of the *‘ulama’* did not accept Khurasani’s position on constitutionalism because of this peculiarity of the Shi’a jurisprudence. Farzaneh paraphrases Khurasani when he discusses his belief that the jurist is a *mutlaq mujtahid* even when his ruling is not accepted by consensus.

Khurasani was perhaps defending the theoretical possibility of the need for a *mutlaq mujtahid* in the religious realm irrespective of political rule and was considering himself as a *mutlaq mujtahid*. In his other political writings he separated the political realm from the religious, but they are in fact interconnected. When considering the possibility of a *mutlaq mujtahid* in the religious sphere, one cannot rule out that the only way to sustain the status of such an absolute position is through force and coercion as we see in today’s Iran. Therefore, Farzaneh’s description of Khurasani’s view on the power of *mutlaq mujtahid* could be considered an earlier form of the theory of *vilayat mutlaqah faqih*—the theory of the absolute power of the jurist used in Iran’s constitution after its 1989 amendments. In all his writings, Khurasani emphasized the primacy of religion over politics. This emphasis should make us more skeptical of how Khurasani would have actually acted had he gained political power.

In the second stage of the Constitutional Revolution, after revolutionaries had executed Shaykh Nuri, Khurasani pushed for implementation of Article 2 of the Iranian constitution, ironically initiated by Nuri, which called for a committee of five *mujtahids* to be elected to oversee parliamentary legislation and evaluate its compatibility with Islam. The committee was created informally for a short period because of Khurasani’s insistence, but withered after his death and as long as the 1907 Constitution was in use. Not so ironically, after the establishment of the Islamic Republic, a similar committee with similar power was included in the new Iranian constitution.

By providing an exhaustive reading of Khurasani’s work, Farzaneh has done a great service to students of Iranian history and has shed light on the life and work of an important religious leader of the constitutional period. Farzaneh’s work would have benefited, however, by greater engagement with the question of the compatibility of religious law and a secular constitution, which remains a topic of heated debate in Iran and throughout the Middle East.

BEHROOZ MOAZAMI
Loyola University New Orleans

FARZIN VEJDANI. *Making History in Iran: Education, Nationalism, and Print Culture*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2015. Pp. ix, 269. \$60.00.

Between 1860 and 1940 the production and consumption of history in Iran moved from the imperial court to the modern school system. By the 1930s, the handwritten chronicles of court historians glorifying the dynasty had

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